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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 10-1059
____________
BAO HUI CHEN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

____________
On Petition for Review from an
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A-072-368-829)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Frederic C. Leeds
____________
Argued June 23, 2011
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENBERG , Circuit Judges
and POLLAK,* District Judge
(Filed: July 21, 2011)
Joshua E. Bardavid [Argued]
22nd Floor
401 Broadway
New York, NY 10013-0000

*

The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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Theodore N. Cox
Suite 701
401 Broadway
New York, NY 10013-0000

Attorneys for Petitioner
Benjamin Zeitlin [Argued]
Sharon M. Clay
Eric H. Holder
Thomas W. Hussey
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

Attorneys for Respondent
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Bao Hui Chen, a citizen of China and a native of Fujian province, seeks review of
a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision reversing the Immigration Judge‟s (IJ)
grant of asylum. We will deny Chen‟s petition and affirm the BIA‟s order of removal.
I
Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, we summarize them only briefly.
Chen entered the United States without inspection on July 10, 2001. On October
7, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a Notice to Appear,
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charging Chen with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Before the IJ, Chen
conceded removability, but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
The IJ heard testimony on the merits of Chen‟s asylum application on December
15, 2008. Chen testified that he and his wife, Lung Yiu Tai, have four children, all of
whom were born in China. In 1996, Chen‟s wife was subjected to forced sterilization. In
addition, the family was fined a total of 21,000 RMB for violating China‟s family
planning policies.1 Chen, who earned 800 RMB per month (or 9,600 RMB per year) as a
construction worker, was forced to borrow 11,000 RMB from his family and friends to
pay off a portion of the fines. Chen testified that “[t]he[] heavy fines crippled [him] as a
sole provider for the family,” and he stated that he “had no choice but to flee from
China.” App. 578. He borrowed an additional $50,000 from his family and friends, and
hired a snakehead to smuggle him into the United States. Since his arrival to this
country, Chen has been able to pay back the 11,000 RMB he borrowed from his family
and friends, as well as the 9,000 RMB fine imposed in 2001.2 He has also sent enough
1

The parties dispute the timing of these fines. While agreeing that Chen was
forced to pay a total of 11,000 RMB prior to leaving the country in 2001, the Government
maintains that the additional 9,000 RMB fine was imposed only after his wife sought
documentation to support his asylum application. Chen claims that the entire 21,000
RMB fine was assessed in 1996, and that the various payments over the years (including
the 9,000 RMB fine) were installments on the single fine.
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It is not clear whether Chen has repaid the $50,000 loan he borrowed from his
family to pay the snakehead.
3

money to his family to pay for his children‟s medical care and educational expenses and
to maintain the family home.
After hearing Chen‟s testimony and considering “a number of corroborating
documents verifying his situation,” the IJ determined that Chen was credible. App. 21.
The IJ also held that the 21,000 RMB fine imposed on Chen‟s family—which exceeded
two years‟ salary—was a severe economic deprivation giving rise to a presumption of
future persecution.3 In so holding, the IJ expressly rejected the Government‟s assertion
that a person who pays a snakehead $50,000 must be able to afford the lesser fine of
21,000 RMB (or approximately $3,095). The IJ found that Chen‟s $50,000 loan was an
“invest[ment] in his future . . . to pay off the debt he owed in his home country where he
had over two years of economic wage loss impacting him.” App. 23-24.4
In a decision dated December 9, 2009, the BIA reversed the IJ‟s grant of asylum
and ordered Chen deported. Finding that Chen “was able to pay off the fines with loans
from friends and relatives,” “obtain the assistance of a smuggler to travel to the United
States,” and “pay for medical care and the education of his children,” the BIA concluded
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Although the IJ held that it need not reach Chen‟s claims for withholding of
removal or relief under the CAT, it noted that Chen “would have met his burden of proof
under these theories as well.” App. 26.
4

The IJ was also unconvinced by the Government‟s claim that because Chen‟s
family remained in their home, they did not suffer any economic deprivation. The IJ
explained that the family‟s well-being depended entirely on Chen‟s income in the United
States, and again, was not a reflection of Chen‟s earning capacity in China.
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that Chen did not suffer a severe economic deprivation and thus “failed to establish that
he suffered . . . past persecution.” App. 10 (citing Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 169 (3d
Cir. 2005) (holding that “a fine of more than a year and a half‟s salary; blacklisting from
any government employment and from most other forms of legitimate employment; the
loss of health benefits, school tuition, and food rations; and the confiscation of household
furniture and appliances from a relatively poor family constitute deliberate imposition of
severe economic disadvantage which could threaten [the] family‟s freedom if not their
lives . . . .”)). The BIA also held that Chen “has not demonstrated a reasonable
possibility that he will be persecuted for „other resistance‟ to the coercive population
control rules in China.”
Chen filed a timely petition for review.
II
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA‟s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a). Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007). We review the
BIA‟s findings for substantial evidence and may not disturb them “„unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.‟” Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562
F.3d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Where the BIA renders
its own decision and does not merely adopt the opinion of the IJ, we review the BIA‟s
decision, not that of the IJ. Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an applicant may demonstrate
eligibility for asylum by showing either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). In Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157
(3d Cir. 2005), we held that “the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage
which threatens a petitioner‟s life or freedom may constitute persecution.” Id. at 168
(adopting the “severe” economic deprivation standard set forth in Matter of Acosta, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)).5
Chen claims the BIA discounted “substantial and highly relevant” evidence in the
record that he suffered a “severe” economic deprivation due to his resistance to China‟s
family planning policies. Specifically, he argues that the BIA failed to consider evidence
that he was denied government benefits, such as free health care and educational services,
following the birth of his fourth child. In his testimony before the IJ, however, Chen
maintained only that he paid for his children‟s medical expenses and education himself,
App. 235; he did not testify that he did so because the government denied him these

5

Zhen Hua Li was a mechanic who worked in a government-sponsored factory.
Li, 400 F.3d at 160. Following the birth of his fourth child, Li was effectively blacklisted
from all government employment, stripped of the health and educational benefits
associated with government work, and fined a total of 1,200 RMB (the equivalent of
twenty-months‟ salary). Id. at 169. Chinese authorities also confiscated Li‟s refrigerator,
television, and other household items that Li alleged were “significant objects.” Id. We
stated that while the “issue is close,” id. at 159, in the aggregate, “the economic
restrictions allegedly faced by the Li family were „severe.‟” Id. at 169.
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services to punish him for his resistance to family planning policies. Cf. Li, 400 F.3d at
169 (finding that the loss of the alien‟s government job in China constituted a loss in “not
only income, but also health coverage, food and medicine rations, and educational
benefits”). Moreover, while the record reflects that Chen‟s wife was refused public
notary services because of the family‟s outstanding debts to the state, this deprivation
does not constitute a “severe” economic deprivation.
Chen also argues that the BIA failed to consider the IJ‟s finding that Chen would
not have been able to pay off his fines had he not moved to the United States. However,
Chen bears the burden of showing that he suffered “persecution in the past,” 8 C.F.R. §
208.13, not that he would have suffered persecution had circumstances been different. As
the BIA explained, the “availability of other sources of income has been a key factor in
assessing the impact of economic sanctions.” In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 174 (B.I.A.
2007) (citing Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that an
alien‟s loss of a job and an apartment based on religion and ethnicity did not amount to
past persecution where the government had given him eight months to find a new
residence, his wife remained employed, and he had not attempted to find other work) and
Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the forced closing
of an alien‟s restaurant did not constitute past persecution where he continued to operate
other profitable businesses)). Thus, while a fine that “reduce[s] an applicant to an
impoverished existence” may give rise to a valid claim for asylum, a “heavy fine leveled
7

against a wealthy individual” will not qualify as a “severe” economic disadvantage “if the
person remains relatively wealthy and experienced no meaningful change in life style or
standard of living.” Id.; see Mirisawo v. Holder, 599 F.3d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a citizen of Zimbabwe could not claim that the destruction of her home
deprived her of a basic necessity of life, because she “never lived in the house and was
living and working in the United States as a live-in housekeeper”).
Here, it is undisputed that Chen was able to earn enough money in the United
States to pay off his fines to the Chinese Government. Moreover, the record is clear that
Chen and his family continued to receive shelter, food, health care, education, and other
basic necessities throughout the relevant time period. Thus, substantial evidence supports
the BIA‟s finding that Chen‟s family did not suffer a “severe” economic deprivation due
to the imposition of the 21,000 RMB fine. Compare App. 9 (finding that Chen‟s “family
continued to reside in the same house, and the respondent was able to pay for medical
care and the education of his children”), with Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 194 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding that “the seizure of property as significant as the family farm and
truck, when those very assets served as the exclusive source of the family‟s livelihood,
constitutes a severe economic sanction”).
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the BIA‟s holding that Chen has not shown
that he suffered past economic persecution in his country of origin. Moreover, we agree
with the BIA that because Chen has fully repaid the 21,000 RMB fine to the Chinese
8

Government, he no longer has a reasonable fear of economic deprivation due to his
unpaid debt to the State. Accordingly, we will deny Chen‟s petition for review.
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POLLAK, District Judge, concurring.
I concur in the court’s opinion and judgment. I think it appropriate to add a few
words.
After argument I was of the view that the BIA’s order denying asylum to Bao Hui
Chen was in error and that Chen’s petition for review should be granted. The imposition
on Chen of fines totaling nearly 21,000 RMB, the equivalent of more than two years’
wages, seemed economic deprivation so acute as to constitute economic persecution. I
was strengthened in this preliminary view by the fact that the fines imposed on Chen
actually exceeded, albeit modestly so, the fines imposed on Zhen Hua Li, whose case this
court considered in Li v. Attorney General, 400 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2005). There, this court
held that Li’s allegations, if established, did constitute economic persecution. But my
post-argument assessment has proved inadequate. I am persuaded by this court’s opinion
that, notwithstanding the similarity in fines, there are decisive differences between
Chen’s case and Li’s case which weigh against Chen’s claim. Chen suffered no sanctions
additional to the fines. By contrast, (1) Li lost his government job, and was blacklisted
from further government employment; (2) Li and his family lost medical and educational
benefits; and (3) a number of household furnishings were confiscated from his home.
And in Judge Becker’s opinion for the court in Li v. Attorney General, it was these severe
incremental deprivations on top of the fines that were key to this court’s conclusion that
Li was the subject of economic persecution. Id. at 169.
The holding in this case is that the fines imposed on Chen, though “onerous” as
the BIA characterized them, were not so severe an economic deprivation as to constitute
1

economic persecution, and, hence, that Chen was not entitled to asylum. I join that
holding.
But beyond this court’s holding this case entails a cautionary lesson. When Li’s
case arose, the BIA ruled that Li did not qualify for asylum. This court ruled otherwise.
In ruling on the case at bar the BIA found that Chen was not as oppressively
disadvantaged as Li, and we today conclude that the BIA adduced substantial evidence in
support of that finding. But it would, I think, be a mistake to draw the inference that the
quantum of economic deprivation suffered by Li is the minimum standard that must be
met by one claiming economic persecution. I would suggest that the BIA and this court
must be alert to scenarios involving punishments which, while grave and lasting, may
take forms different from those visited on Li, or are only marginally less destabilizing
than those suffered by Li. The economic deprivation so daunting as to constitute
economic persecution is not a closed category.
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